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I. Introduction
Following the United States Supreme Court's most recent ruling on the
true threats doctrine in Virginia v. Black,' significant conflict emerged
among the federal circuit courts. The primary issue was whether the First
* Doctoral student, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, School of Journalism and Mass
Communication; J.D. (2009) University of South Carolina School of Law. Many thanks to Dr. R.
Michael Hoefges for the helpful comments and guidance devoted generously as these ideas and
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1. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
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Amendment, as the Court interpreted in Black, requires a subjective intent
standard to be read into all statutes that criminalize true threats, or whether
the First Amendment only requires the prosecution to demonstrate
that a reasonable person would consider the message to be a true
threat. A number of high-profile cases involving threatening Internet
communications have renewed the public dialogue about the limits of
Internet speech freedom and the role of examining intent to distinguish
between protected political speech and unprotected threats.
During the summer of 2012, as President Barack Obama pursued his
reelection bid, cascades of tweets replete with varying levels of vitriol drew
2the attention of the United States Secret Service. As a result, two Twitter
users were prosecuted under a federal statute prohibiting threats against the
President of the United States. The factual circumstances in each case,
and the context in which the Twitter posts appeared, raised significant
questions regarding each defendant's subjective intent to intimidate or
threaten the President.4 But neither law enforcement nor the courts have
treated the seemingly crucial issue of subjective intent uniformly.
Following the investigations, Secret Service spokesman Brian Leary
acknowledged that "[the Secret Service has] the right and certainly the
obligation to determine a person's intent" with regard to threats posted on
social media.5
Less than one month before the arrests in the Presidential threats cases,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit strongly stated in
United States v. Jeffries that the subjective intent of the speaker "had
nothing to do with" the analysis of a true threat.6 In June 2013, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in United States v. Turner,
similarly upheld an objective intent standard under a federal statute that
prohibits communicating threats to a federal judge. Prior to Black, the
Ninth Circuit had departed from the purely objective standard for true
threats in Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists.
Today, the Ninth Circuit remains one of the only federal circuit courts that






6. United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 479 (6th Cir. 2013) (applying 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)),
cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 59 (Oct. 7, 2013).
7. United States v. Turner, 720 F.3d 411, 426-27 (2d Cir. 2013) (applying 18 U.S.C.
§ 115(a)(1)(B)).
8. Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1071 (9th Cir. 2002).
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require a finding of a subjective intent to intimidate in order to sustain a
conviction in all true threats cases.9
In June 2014, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Elonis v. United
States, a case arising out of the Third Circuit, which promises to clarify the
issue of whether the First Amendment requires courts to consider the
subjective intent of the speaker to uphold a conviction under all true threats
statutes.'0 The facts of the case detail how Anthony Elonis, an estranged
husband, allegedly threatened his wife through Facebook posts that
included his own violent amateur rap lyrics and references to off-color
sketch comedy posted to YouTube that, ironically, referred to the First
Amendment criminalization of threats against the President." Elonis
argued in the petition for certiorari that the "inherently impersonal nature of
online communication makes [online] messages inherently susceptible to
misinterpretation"12 and that "modem media allow personal reflections
intended for a small audience (or no audience) to be viewed widely by
people who are unfamiliar with the context [surrounding the
communication]."' Elonis argued further that the trial court misread Black
and failed to instruct the jury to consider his subjective intent consistent
with the First Amendment.14
This article explores these divergent applications of the true threats
doctrine, and specifically examines the subjective intent and objective
speaker-listener standards in cases involving threats transmitted over the
Internet. The discussion focuses on federal court cases that both highlight
and downplay media context in an attempt to protect advocacy interests of
speakers-especially those who use abstract, inflammatory speech on
interconnected social media platforms. Part II discusses the origins of the
true threats doctrine and its relevance to recent and well-publicized cases
involving Internet communications. Part III reviews the relevant scholarly
literature regarding the confusion in true threats jurisprudence, the
divergence of opinion regarding the correct legal standards for true threats,
9. See, e.g., United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 627-33 (9th Cir. 2005) (interpreting the
plurality opinion in Black as requiring a subjective intent standard); United States v. Stewart, 420
F.3d 1007, 1016-19 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying a subjective intent standard to sustain a conviction
for a threat made against a federal judge); United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir.
2011) (affirming the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Black that the First Amendment requires the
prosecution to prove that the defendant subjectively intended to threaten another in order to
sustain a conviction under all true threats statutes).
10. See United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted 82 U.S.L.W. 3538
(U.S. June 16, 2014) (No. 13-983).
11. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *4-14, Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 2014 WL 645438 (No. 13-983).
12. Id. at *34.
13. Id.
14. Id. at *14--16, 25-32.
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and the importance of context in interpreting a threatening Internet
message. Part IV analyzes relevant case law within a methodological
framework designed to examine the federal courts' reliance on various
contextual factors in interpreting Internet speech. This article will also
highlight the importance of reformulating the true threats doctrine under a
totality of the circumstances approach that holds to the doctrine's origins
and accounts for emerging modes of interpersonal communication. The
article will then conclude by discussing the issues raised by the Supreme
Court's forthcoming reexamination of the true threats intent requirement in
Elonis. This case could either offer long-awaited clarity or raise further
concerns for speakers who frequently engage in violent Internet speech
that could be intimidating but do not intend to threaten a specific
individual or group.
II. Origins of the True Threats Doctrine and Key Cases of
Internet Threats
Prior to the emergence of the Internet, in-person communication, radio,
and television broadcast were the only available outlets for live public
address. Threats aimed at political targets, as opposed to average citizens,
required some physical assemblage of people, access to broadcast
technology, or the use of more traditional forms of correspondence.
Nowadays, Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and other social media platforms
provide direct access to public officials (many of whom develop and desire
an online presence) and create instant, and often mobile, public forums.
Political speech, even in simple forms of direct public address, frequently
involves complex messages that may involve innuendo, metaphor, satire,
sarcasm, and occasionally violent calls for action. The difficulty in
interpreting these intricacies is only exacerbated in Internet-based
communications, but the principles in the doctrine remain foundational.
Before addressing the nuanced nature of political rhetoric as Internet
speech, the discussion must first outline some cases and statutes that
underscore the true threats doctrine and the distinction between protected
speech and unprotected threats.
The federal statute prohibiting threats against the President of the
United States is "of an ancient vintage."" Title 18, section 871 of the
United States Code traces its policy origins from the English Statute of
Treason,16 through the passing and eventual repeal of the Alien and Sedition
Act and to the statute's modem iteration, enacted in 1948.17 The federal
15. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 709 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
16. Note, Threats to Take the Life of the President, 32 HARV. L. REV. 724, 725 (1919).
17. See Watts, 394 U.S. at 710 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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statute criminalizing threats against the President had been in force for
nearly forty years by the time defendant Robert Watts, in Watts v. United
States, uttered the antiwar protestations that allegedly threatened the life of
President Lyndon B. Johnson, and set the groundwork for the modem true
threats jurisprudence.'8 Watts was indicted and convicted under section
871.19 As the United States Armed Forces had become increasingly
entrenched in the war in Vietnam, domestic political and social tensions
had escalated steadily and the resulting protests took varying forms.20 The
unrest that marked the antiwar protest movements in the 1960s stirred
emboldened antiwar advocates whose messages sometimes intimated
violence toward government officials.2 1 Watts's rhetoric was not atypical
for the Vietnam-era protest climate, but his First Amendment challenge to
Section 871, as applied to his remarks, ushered in the "true threats"
doctrine in an unusual way.
In 1969, without hearing oral arguments,22 a divided Supreme Court
held in Watts that political hyperbole, even though it is often "vituperative,
abusive, and inexact," is distinguishable from a true threat and is protected
under the First Amendment.23 The Court's principal distinction between
political hyperbole and a true threat has become the First Amendment
bedrock for the true threats doctrine, which has been applied to conduct
ranging from cross burnings to YouTube posts.24 In the years since Watts,
the federal circuit courts have encountered significant challenges in
applying the abstract true threats doctrine to nuanced factual circumstances.
The Ninth Circuit has remarked that "[t]he Supreme Court has provided
benchmarks, but no definition" of true threats.25 True threats cases often
involve civilian targets, and occasionally involve threats against the
President or other federal officials. Moreover, the public policy interests
differ when the doctrine is applied to threats against public officials rather
18. Id. at 706 (per curiam) (emphasis added) (describing a rally held at the Washington
Monument, where Watts stated to the crowd: "They always holler at us to get an education. And
now I have already received my draft classification as I-A and I have got to report for my
physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I
want to get in my sights is L.B.J").
19. Id.
20. See Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Expression in Wartime, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 975,
990-92 (1968).
21. For a general discussion of violent antiwar protests, see Doug McAdam and Yang Su,
The War at Home: Antiwar Protests and Congressional Voting, 1965 to 1973, 67 AM.
SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 696 (2002).
22. Watts, 394 U.S. at 711 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 708.
24. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003); see also United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473
(6th Cir. 2013).
25. Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1071 (9th Cir. 2002).
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than private persons. Nevertheless, in both rhetorical areas, courts must
balance political and social speech interests against the harm that the
speech inflicts regardless of the target's official status. Therefore, an
analysis of the political and social advocacy interests asserted in the
allegedly threatening communication can contribute to the discussion of the
doctrine in equal measure.
The Supreme Court most recently discussed the true threats doctrine in
Virginia v. Black, where two defendants were convicted separately of
violating a Virginia cross-burning statute aimed at protecting classes of
people who had been targeted by extremist groups like the Ku Klux Klan.26
The Court ruled, in a plurality opinion, that the Virginia statute was
unconstitutionally overbroad because it treated the act of cross burning as
prima facie evidence of intent to threaten, which risked chilling protected
core political speech.2 7 Justice O'Connor, writing for the plurality,
acknowledged that "' [t]rue threats' encompass those statements where the
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to
commit an act of unlawful violence" toward the target.28  Some
commentators and courts have interpreted Justice O'Connor's use of the
phrase "means to communicate" to indicate that the First Amendment
requires courts to examine the defendant's subjective intent.29 Others have
argued that the phrase indicated only that the communication must be
intentional and not accidental or coerced.30 The constitutional uncertainty
arising from Black has split federal circuit courts' interpretations regarding
the constitutionality of intent standards and the First Amendment
significance of media and cultural context in the assessment of true threats.
Although the Ninth Circuit decided Planned Parenthood v. American
Coalition of Life Activists one year before Black, the former illustrates how
cases involving widespread Internet communications can pose deeply
contextual issues and command massive public attention.31 Planned
Parenthood involved a series of publicly distributed, hard-copy
"WANTED" and "GUILTY" posters and a website known as the
26. See Black, 538 U.S. at 348.
27. Id. at 364-65.
28. Id. at 359 (emphasis added).
29. E.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Threats and Meanings: How the Facts Govern First
Amendment Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1337, 1348 (2006); United States v. Bagdasarian, 652
F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2011).
30. E.g., Frederick Schauer, Intentions, Conventions, and the First Amendment: The Case
of Cross-Burning, 55 SUP. CT. REv. 197, 216 (2003); W. Wat Hopkins, Cross Burning Revisited:
What the Supreme Court Should Have Done in Virginia v. Black and Why It Didn't, 26 HASTtNGS
COMM. & ENT, L.J. 269, 308-09 (2004).
31. See generally Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1071
(9th Cir. 2002).
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"Nuremburg Files."32  The website identified physicians who performed
abortion services and indicated whether they were actively working,
wounded, or killed.33  The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, voted 6-5 to
uphold a jury verdict in favor of Planned Parenthood and the physicians.34
Although the defendants argued that their Internet posts were protected as
abstract political advocacy, invoking the lineage of First Amendment
incitement cases, the Ninth Circuit applied the true threats doctrine.35 The
court held that the posters and the website, viewed in their full context and
to the extent that they intended to threaten the appellants, were true threats
and thus unprotected by the Constitution. In this respect, the facts in
Planned Parenthood challenged the Ninth Circuit to determine whether the
posters and the website, in light of their cultural and media context,
amounted to a true threat lacking any protection under the First Amendment.
The Second and Sixth Circuits have recently analyzed cases involving
threatening communications about judges, which the defendants
transmitted through a publicly available Internet blog and posted on
YouTube and Facebook, respectively. In each case, the court (including
dissents) assessed the extent to which the defendant's language and choice
of medium indicated proscribable threatening behavior.
True threats cases commonly hinge on whether the jurisdiction adopts
the subjective intent of the speaker standard or the objective understanding
of the recipient standard. As such, Jeffries and Turner,4 0 viewed alongside
32. Id. at 1065-66.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1062-63.
35. The incitement doctrine is related to the true threats doctrine in that it punishes speech
that is likely to result in or encourage immediate harm to others. The First Amendment protects
abstract political advocacy-even the advocacy of violence-so long as the advocacy does not
amount to incitement of "imminent lawless action." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969); see also Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1092 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (finding that
"[t]he majority cite[d] not a scintilla of evidence ... that plaintiffs or someone associated with
them would carry out the threatened harm," and indicating that Judge Reinhardt would have
decided Planned Parenthood under the incitement test).
36. Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1088 (majority opinion).
37. Id. at 1072 (rejecting the ACLA's argument that the posters and website were political
speech under Watts, and could not lose the character of protected political speech by context).
38. See United States v. Turner, 720 F.3d 411, 413 (2d Cir. 2013) ("On June 2, 2009,
Harold Turner published a blog post declaring that three Seventh Circuit judges deserved to die
for their recent decision that the Second Amendment did not apply to the states."); United States
v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 475-77 (6th Cir. 2012) (describing a music video that Franklin Delano
Jeffries II posted on YouTube containing "the menacing (threats to kill the judge if he doesn't 'do
the right thing' at an upcoming custody hearing)").
39. See Turner, 720 F.3d at 420-25; Jeffries, 692 F.3d at 478-83.
40. See Turner, 720 F.3d at 434 (Pooler, J. dissenting) (observing that Turner's comments
were political advocacy, and that "[tlhis reading is furthered by the fact that Turner's words were
posted on a blog on a publicly accessible website").
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Watts, Black, and Planned Parenthood, illustrate the significance of
analyzing the media used to transmit violent communications to others for
the sake of potentially protected social and political purposes. The debate
over the subjective intent and objective intent standards has persisted in the
case law among judges, in the literature among scholars, and has now
ripened for Supreme Court review in Elonis v. United States. Few
commentators have dealt with the practical effect of the speaker's chosen
medium on the objective interpretation of the message's political or
threatening content, its actual effect on the recipient, or the question
whether the Supreme Court should recognize choice of media as a key
component of contextual analysis under Watts and the First Amendment.41
Federal court cases arising after Black that implicate the true threats
doctrine as applied to online messages illustrate the profound cultural
and First Amendment issues with which the Supreme Court must grapple
as it hears Elonis during the upcoming fall term.42
III. Literature Review
The majority of the literature reviewed for this study on the
development of the true threats doctrine since Black has focused on two
related issues: (1) whether the First Amendment requires courts to consider
a speaker's subjective intent to intimidate the target of the communication
in addition to finding that the communication is objectively threatening on
its face; and (2) if the First Amendment requires inquiry into the speaker's
subjective intent, what weight courts should give to the medium of
communication and related contextual factors in light of the limited
guidance the lower courts received from the Supreme Court in Black. The
Supreme Court has already recognized the complexity inherent in
regulating the Internet-a simultaneously interpersonal and widespread
mode of communication.43
The Supreme Court has offered relatively little guidance, however,
regarding the definitions of, and distinctions between, true threats and
political advocacy. As such, several commentators have questioned
whether the true threats doctrine requires further reformulation to
accommodate free speech concerns that accompany technological
41. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam).
42. See United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3538
(U.S. June 16, 2014) (No. 13-983).
43. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). In Reno, Justice Stevens characterized the
Internet from the publisher's point of view as "a vast platform from which to address and hear
from a worldwide audience of millions of readers, viewers, researchers, and buyers." Id. at 853.
See infra Part III.A. for commentators' discussion of the relative importance of Internet
context in true threats cases.
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innovation and new communicative contexts." In light of the myriad
contextual interpretations that juries and judges can make of Internet
communications, commentators have demanded clarity on the issue along
with more guidance from the Court on interpreting the social meaning of
violent Internet speech. This section traces the scholarly dialogue
surrounding the appropriate constitutional intent standard for the true
threats doctrines. It also addresses some of the complex issues raised by
including the mode of communication as a relevant contextual factor in
upholding or overturning true threats convictions.
A. Subjective Intent: An (Additional) Standard Post-Black?
Kenneth Karst has explained that one settled element in the
constitutional true threats jurisprudence is that a "true threat" must be
objectively threatening: The prosecution must prove either that a
reasonable speaker would anticipate that the message would cause fear or
intimidation, or that an objectively reasonable listener would interpret the
message to communicate a threat of bodily harm or death.45 True threats
are, by definition, objectively threatening.46 If a true-threats test lacked an
objective requirement, it would be an "intolerable intrusion on free speech"
because it would render potentially valuable speech unprotected by the
First Amendment solely because of its impact on a single recipient.47
Frederick Schauer has challenged whether the First Amendment
requires a finding of general or specific intent on behalf of the speaker to
support a conviction of a true threat.48 Acknowledging that the cases
involving true threats are unclear, Schauer indicated that precedent did not
bound the Supreme Court in Black to hold that the speaker must
44. See Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 283, 316 (2001) (discussing the proliferation of scholarly attention surrounding the true
threats doctrine in the Internet age); see also John Rothchild, Menacing Speech and the First
Amendment: A Functional Approach to Incitement That Threatens, 8 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 207,
240-41 (1999) (describing the greater impact of threats law on the Internet as opposed to on other
mediums); Anna S. Andrews, When Is a Threat "Truly" a Threat Lacking First Amendment
Protection? A Proposed True Threats Test to Safeguard Free Speech Rights in the Age of the
Internet, UCLA ONLINE INST. FOR CYBERSPACE L. & POL'Y (1999), available at
http://www.gseis.ucla.eduliclp/aandrews2.htm (describing the unique ease of conveying threats
on Internet media); Jeremy C. Martin, Note, Deconstructing "Constructive Threats":
Classification and Analysis of Threatening Speech After Watts and Planned Parenthood, 31 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 751, 779-80 (2000) (describing the unique potential for the Internet to be
a vehicle to convey threats and harassment).
45. Karst, supra note 29, at 1348.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Schauer, supra note 30, at 216.
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subjectively intend to intimidate the target in order to be guilty of
communicating a true threat under the First Amendment.4 9
Schauer emphasized that convictions in all criminal cases rest on the
prosecution's demonstration of a perpetrated harm, the defendant's intent
to perform the act that caused the harm, and the demonstration of some
reprehensible mens rea.50 Schauer proposed that an intent analysis is
impliedly built into all criminal true threats statutes, which renders a
specific First-Amendment-based intent requirement "superfluous."
Furthermore, the First Amendment case law includes numerous examples
of statutes that proscribe expressive conduct, regardless of the speaker's
specific intent, and harm-based rationales for restrictions on speech
routinely survive constitutional scrutiny.52 Schauer's provocative piece
traced the confusion in the true threats doctrine to the failure of the Black
court to articulate the linguistic or expressive features of a message that
distinguish a true threat from other communications of protected abstract,
though violent and harmful, ideas. He suggested that the Supreme Court
had interpreted the purpose of the true threats doctrine in divergent ways
from its announcement of the doctrine in Watts to its most recent
discussion in Black.54 He then concluded that Watts explained, by briefly
explicating the concept of political hyperbole, what a true threat is not
rather than providing a usable definition or test to determine what a true
threat is.55 The misunderstanding of the threatening features of harmful
speech opened the true threats doctrine to divergent First Amendment
treatment based on differing judicial interpretations of linguistic
and contextual factors.5 6
W. Wat Hopkins similarly concluded that the Supreme Court in Black
failed to clarify the distinction between protected ideological advocacy and
unprotected threatening speech.57  According to Hopkins, the Court in
Black contributed to the existing confusion surrounding the true threats
doctrine, particularly with regard to inflammatory expressive conduct, such
49. Id. at 217-18.
5 0. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 216-20 (drawing on other unprotected speech classifications such as obscenity
to illustrate how intent to harm is not necessarily required to sustain a proscription on
dissemination of harmful speech or material).
53. Id. at 213-14 (citing KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF
LANGUAGE (Oxford 1989)).
54. Schauer, supra note 30, at 213-14 & n. 54.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 213-14 & n. 54.
57. Hopkins, supra note 30 at 313-14.
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as cross burning, by jurisprudentially engrafting "intimidation."" The
inclusion of "intimidation," which is an ambiguous concept, to a true
threats doctrine only deters the type of speech that causes immediate fear
and psychological harm.59 Hopkins also concluded that he Court failed to
settle the issue of whether the cross burning in Black amounted to
constitutionally protected political speech.60  Instead, the Court held that
some cross burnings were protected and some were not.61  Thus, according
to Hopkins, the Court issued an unnecessary holding that simultaneously
confused states that passed anti-intimidation legislation and begged for
another case to clarify the true threats doctrine.6 2
In light of the Court's limited discussion of the distinctions between
protected expression and unprotected true threats since the doctrine's
inception, some federal circuit courts have rejected the subjective intent test
for true threats and relied solely on an objective test despite Black's
holding.6 3 Commentators differ significantly on whether a subjective intent
standard is required under the true threats jurisprudence at all, and the
decision in Black has only further complicated the intent requirement under
the First Amendment. Writing before the Court decided Black, Jennifer E.
Rothman suggested that the Supreme Court should incorporate a subjective
intent standard into true threats jurisprudence to avoid inadvertently
applying a simple negligence standard to true threat cases.64 Rothman
noted that the Ninth Circuit shared the concern that the speech restrictive
objective standard should be counterbalanced by a subjective inquiry in
every true threats case.5
Caleb Mason described the Ninth Circuit's concern as something akin
to a trailblazing application of First Amendment principles to laws
governing threatening speech.66 Reading Black as a doctrinal shift, the
58. Id. at 308-09.
59. Id.
60. Id at 313-14.
61. Id
62. Id. at 272-73 (2004).
63. Andrews, supra note 44; see also Paul T. Crane, "True Threats" and the Issue ofIntent,
92 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1261-62 (2006) (discussing varying interpretations of the objective
standard as either a "reasonable speaker" or "reasonable listener" standard).
64. Rothman, supra note 44, at 316 (citing Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 46-47
(1975) (Marshall, J., concurring) (separately writing to emphasize that, "[u]nder the objective
construction by contrast, the defendant is subject to prosecution for any statement that might
reasonably be interpreted as a threat, regardless of the speaker's intention. In essence, the
objective interpretation embodies a negligence standard .... We have long been reluctant to
infer that a negligence standard was intended in criminal statutes.")).
65. Id. at 308.
66. Caleb Mason, Framing Context, Anonymous Internet Speech, and Intent: New
Uncertainty About the Constitutional Test for True Threats, 41 SW. L. REV. 43, 68 (2011).
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Ninth Circuit held in 2011 that "the subjective test set forth in Black must
be read into all threat statutes that criminalize pure speech."67 According
to Mason, if Black is interpreted to abrogate the objective test, as some
commentators suggested,8 it would indicate a significant departure from
current First Amendment jurisprudence and the pre-Black guidance from
other federal circuit courts that had applied purely objective standards to
gauge a true threat.69
Commentary has also focused on the Sixth Circuit's discussion in
Jeffries of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Black and the subjective
intent requirement.70  In Jeffries, the Sixth Circuit upheld its existing
objective standard in true threats cases, while also noting that Black turned
on the "overbreadth" of the Virginia cross-burning statute, and not on the
question of whether the First Amendment requires a subjective intent
standard alongside the objective standard.
Following the Jeffries decision, a commentator writing for the Harvard
Law Review chastised the Sixth Circuit for unwisely refusing to follow the
Black decision, stating that the "plain language in Black is most reasonably
read as adopting the subjective intent requirement."7 2 Citing the Jeffries
court's reliance on the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of Black, the article
argued that one of the chief limitations of Black's language was that it
permitted circuits that adopt an objective, reasonable listener standard to
contort the Black decision and ignore its clear guidance that the First
Amendment requires subjective intent for a communication to amount to a
true threat. The article interpreted Black as requiring lower courts to
balance subjective intent against an objectively reasonable interpretation of
the allegedly threatening material to accurately assess all of the contextual
complexities of communications in true threats cases.74
67. United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added).
68. See Schauer, supra note 30, at 217 (2003) ("[I]t is plain that .... the Black majority. . .
believed that the First Amendment imposed upon Virginia a requirement that the threatener have
specifically intended to intimidate.").
69. See Mason, supra note 66, at 68.
70. United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 479 (6th Cir. 2012).
71. Id. at 479-81 (discussing Black and refusing to interpret the case as requiring
a subjective intent standard in true threats cases).
72. First Amendment-True Threat-Sixth Circuit Holds That Subjective Intent Is Not
Required by the First Amendment When Prosecuting Criminal Threats- United States v. Jeffries,
692 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 2012), 126 HARV. L. REv. 1138, 1142 (2013).
73. Id. at 1142-43.
74. Id. at 1141.
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B. Subjective Intent and the Internet: The Role of the Internet in Meaning Making
Leslie Kendrick has argued that the Supreme Court has a long history
of weighing harms to message recipients against the likely chilling effect
that harm-based regulations might have on legitimate political and social
speech.15  The true threats doctrine attempts to strike the constitutional
balance between the inherent value in freely expressing unpopular views
and the state's interest in preventing psychological and emotional harms.76
Kendrick has argued, however, that judges often rely on nothing more than
empirical guesswork when interpreting the effectiveness of intent
requirements through the lens of chilling effect theory. Her critique
supports looking toward other theoretical lenses to understand the
interrelation between intent, meaning, and harm.
As social media has become commonplace, prosecutors have seen a
proliferation of cases involving threatening Internet speech.78  The
emboldening of Internet speech raises additional questions regarding how
participants in social media platforms create and interpret Internet
messages relative to other analog communication forms. For example, are
linguistic meanings supplemented, or perhaps altered, by the Internet-
mediated context in which the communication appears?79
The literature on the impact of First Amendment principles on Internet
semiotics, or meaning making, has focused on how Internet mediation
creates, and sometimes distorts, speakers' intended meanings. For
example, Jordan Strauss suggested that the subjectively intended harm in
an allegedly threatening communication is inextricably linked to the
semiotic and linguistic components experienced by the speaker.80
Nevertheless, such a message could manifest an array of meanings based
on the recipient's experience of the same symbolic and linguistic
75. See Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1633, 1648-55 (2013) (discussing how the Supreme Court has treated the intent requirement
in the First Amendment cases and how the chilling effect operates).
76. Id. at 1643 n.36 (citing Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003)).
77. Id. at 1685.
78. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *24, United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2013),
cert. granted 82 U.S.L.W. 3538 (U.S. June 16,2014) (No. 13-983).
79. See Justin Kruger et al., Egocentrism over E-Mail: Can We Communicate as Well as
We Think?, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 925, 933 (2005).
80. Jordan Strauss, Context Is Everything: Towards a More Flexible Rule for Evaluating
True Threats Under the First Amendment, 32 SW. U. L. REV. 231, 257 (2003) (analyzing the pre-
Black intent standard adopted in Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists,
290 F.3d 1058, 1071 (9th Cir. 2002), and discussing another scholar's assertion that the discipline
of semiotics encourages examining the meaning inherent in the use of a particular medium); see
also Daniel Chandler, Strengths ofSemiotic Analysis (Oct. 11, 2014), http://www.aber.ac.uk/med
ia/Documents/S4B/seml0.html.
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components.8' Strauss proposed that "[t]he harm from expressive conduct
comes from a statement's social meaning, which is the perception of a
statement as, for example, threatening danger and thus imposing social
costs."82 To punish threatening communications in a manner that supports
the policy interests of the true threats doctrine, Strauss argued that the
courts must interpret subjective intent through the lens of social semiotics
theory and recognize that the choice of medium reflects the meaning of the
underlying textual material.83  Strauss further argued that courts should
acknowledge the nature of Internet speech that frequently reaches targets
without reference to the message source, thus obscuring a significant
contextual element.84
Kathleen Sullivan has likewise asserted that he Internet eliminates
middlemen who restrain potentially harmful speech. In her view, the
disintermediation feature of Internet communication suggests that instantly
and widely available Internet content is contextually distinguishable from
speech through other media. Strauss, citing Sullivan, made the same
observation and suggested that courts should acknowledge the nature of
Internet messages that lack physical context because they are duplicated
instantly and dispersed widely to diverse geographies and publics.87
Eric Segall conversely suggested that Internet speech maintains its
contextual meaning despite dispersion and diffusion across the Web.88 The
permanence and pervasiveness of Internet content create, rather than dilute,
additional contextual layers within threatening messages.8 9 The public, yet
anonymous, character of the Internet invites angry users to post target-
identifying information wrapped in a cloak of innuendo and invective.90
Segall suggested that construing a threat as a matter of law under the First
Amendment becomes a dangerously hard case when such a context-laden
communication lacks language that suggests a direct threat of imminent
81. See Strauss, supra note 80, at 257.
82. Id. (citing Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation ofSocial Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 943,
951 (1995)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 256-63. For a general discussion of intermediation of Internet speech, see
Sullivan, supra note 70, at 1666-80.
85. Id. at 1670-71.
86. Id.
87. Strauss, supra note 80, at 259-60 (citing Sullivan, supra note 70, at 1671.
88. Eric J. Segall, The Internet as a Game Changer: Reevaluating the True Threats
Doctrine, 44 TEX. TECH L. REv. 183, 195 (2011).
89. Id. at 194.
90. Id. at 195.
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violence toward a specific target.91 Moreover, modem Internet and social
media threats operate upon a pervasive and interpersonal system that
"facilitates the creation of networks of like-minded persons to help carry
out threats," provides dangerous associates with a safe online enclave, and
adds a contextual factor that could impact the target to a greater degree.9 2
The Supreme Court has, perhaps hastily, overprotected speech under the
First Amendment to avoid censorship despite the unique imminence to
online speech that remains online until the speaker chooses, or is forced, to
remove it. 9 3  Some commentators have argued that true threats with
political overtones require a test for imminence, but the literature on
meaning-making through cyberspace indicates that interpreting politically
charged threatening speech does not hinge on developing a more refined
definition for imminence in Internet space.94  Rather, such interpretation
requires a test that examines the totality of the circumstances surrounding
all aspects of the communication, including speaker, medium, and
audience.95
The commentary reviewed in this section suggests that context
suggests meaning, which underlies the gravity of the potential harm in
threatening speech. Courts therefore should thoroughly examine all
relevant contextual interpretations of a message when deciding First
Amendment challenges to true threats prosecutions. Kathleen Sullivan has,
however, cautioned that including media context in the traditional First
Amendment analysis could lead to hasty departures from pragmatic
First Amendment balancing.9 6  Despite acknowledging that the Internet
91. Id. (discussing concerns with the en banc opinion in Planned Parenthood v. American
Coalition of Life Activists, 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001), specifically that the Ninth Circuit
panel attempted to create too fine a distinction between permissible abstract advocacy and
impermissible direct threats).
92. Scott Hammack, The Internet Loophole: Why Threatening Speech On-Line Requires a
Modification of the Courts' Approach to True Threats and Incitement, 36 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 65, 82 (2002).
93. Id.
94. Compare Steven G. Gey, A Few Questions About Cross Burning, Intimidation, and Free
Speech, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1331 (2005) ("The unmistakable message of Claiborne
Hardware seems to be that at least in the context of threatening language with political overtones,
a 'true threat' is defined by the three elements of the Brandenburg test: the words must be
explicit, the words must be spoken in a context in which serious harm is imminent, and the
speaker must possess the specific intent that the harm occur.") with Segall, supra note 88, at 185
("The Supreme Court should recognize that [imminence requirements] should not be applied to
threatening speech posted on the Internet where the very idea of imminence has no real
relationship to the possibility of speech causing actual harm.").
95. See generally Amy E. McCann, Are Courts Taking Internet Threats Seriously Enough?
An Analysis of True Threats Transmitted Over the Internet, as Interpreted in United States v.
Carmichael, 26 PACE L. REV. 523, 547-48 (2006).
96. Sullivan, supra note 70, at 1672.
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provides a contextually distinct communicative mode, Sullivan concluded
that "[i]t [was] a [hard] question whether [] changes in background context
should change the application of existing First Amendment norms."9 7
Sullivan specifically discussed Congress' 1996 proposal to outlaw the
dissemination of bomb-making information, and questioned whether
the fact that such information is posted on the Internet would require courts
to expand the existing First Amendment doctrine to account for a new
dimension of illegal incitement.98 Sullivan concluded that it was unclear
whether posting bomb-making information on the Internet would be more
dangerous than analog methods of communicating potentially
hazardous information simply because the Internet allows
instantaneous and wide accessibility.99
Despite some variation regarding the importance of E-context in true
threats cases, the area remains a critical area for legal scholars concerned
with doctrinal developments in the face of new technologies. The lingering
questions on the importance of the Internet as a contextual factor have been
thoroughly identified as problematic, but courts have rendered divergent
opinions on whether and to what extent the notion of "E-context"'00 fits
within established constitutional principles regarding the importance of the
speaker's intent and other relevant contextual factors.
C. Summary of Scholarship
The scholarship on the potential First Amendment requirement of a
subjective intent standard in true threats cases has roundly acknowledged
the lack of consensus among the courts following Black. Due to a
perceived dearth of guidance from the Court in Watts, however, true threats
jurisprudence has yet to develop a clearly articulated test among the
circuits. The circuit splits on the issue stem mainly from divergent lower
court interpretations of Black's discussion of the speaker's intent. Some
legal scholars have suggested that Black merely made considerable room
for the subjective intent examination rather than adopting it as a bright-line
First Amendment rule. Others more strongly argue that Black requires
examination into the speaker's subjective intent to address First
Amendment concerns related to criminalizing statements that are merely
objectively harmful or made negligently.
As the confusion in the true threats doctrine continues to impact public




100. See infra Part. IV.
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Amendment concerns regarding the responsibility that a speaker bears for
virulent expression communicated to an unknown, yet interconnected,
audience. Indeed, a significant number of true threats cases involve
Internet speech.10 Some scholarly discussion has addressed how Internet
communications can reflect the speaker's intent but may result in
unintended consequences when the full factual context of the message is
lacking and recipients feel threatened. The scholarly discussion of
mediated Internet meaning suggests that Internet communications are
fundamentally different from messages conveyed in person or during
public gatherings because of the technical qualities of the Internet itself.
Internet posts are permanently affixed in cyberspace, regardless of edits
made to them, but the impact of the same posts can be retracted at the click
of a button prior to delivery to any recipient. Due to the possibility of
speech to become decontextualized and impersonal through third-party
sharing, the online media environment tends to promote individualized
readings of messages when content is experienced only by the end user
rather than experienced socially during an authentic, synchronous
exchange. For the purposes of threatening speech, a hyper-individualized
reading of a message lacks the benefit of a true communal response, such
as the laughter among the crowd in Watts.10 2
The issue concerning subjective intent in allegedly threatening speech
post-Black is at the heart of Elonis: what did Justice O'Connor mean when
she stated that true threats are statements whereby the speaker "means to
communicate" a serious expression of intent to harm another?1 0 3 In Elonis,
the Supreme Court will address the issue of speaker's intent for the first
time in an Internet speech case, and may for the first time address many of
the questions raised in the legal scholarship discussed above. Ideally, the
Court should address in its discussion, if not in its holding, whether an
online communication is itself a contextually relevant factor and whether
usage of social media impacts the intended or objective meaning of a
communication. Because Internet media provide a unique contextual
experience, examining how federal courts have analyzed the complexities
of speaker's intent and audience interpretation of Internet messages is
worthwhile to develop a richer sense of the cultural and First Amendment
issues raised in Elonis.
101. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *24, United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2013),
cert. granted 82 U.S.L.W. 3538 (U.S. June 16, 2014) (No. 13-983).
102. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam) (noting the reaction
of the crowd gathered around the speaker).
103. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).




Following the Supreme Court's decision in Virginia v. Black, a number
of federal courts subjected the case to sharply divergent interpretations
regarding whether the First Amendment requires more than an objective
threat in order to sustain a conviction under a true threats statute.104 The
Ninth Circuit held that the First Amendment requires courts to read a
subjective intent standard into all statutes that criminalize pure speech.105
The Fourth Circuit remains committed to its more narrow reading that
Black does not require a showing of subjective intent to find that that the
speaker made an unprotected true threat.0 6 This section recounts a study of
federal courts' post-Black First Amendment analy'sis of the intent standard,
and the role of Internet media in the subjective intent analysis and on the
objective reasonableness of a threat. This article analyzes only cases that
directly discuss Black, as several commentators have identified Black as the
key source of the current circuit splits on the true threats doctrine.107
Moreover, Black underlies the issues on appeal in Elonis.08  This article
has not considered cases preceding Black except to the extent they provide
background information regarding relevant circuit court precedent.
The cases isolated for analysis in this article focus on the lower and
intermediate courts' construal of the Internet communications. I have
restricted the discussion purposefully to a more specific term, "E-context"
which is used throughout this article. The term E-context in the true threats
context refers to online, Internet-mediated communications excluding
direct communication platforms. The term encompasses multimedia and
text postings to third-party hosted websites and forums, original hosted
Web content, and the use of social networking applications, including, but
not limited to mobile iterations of existing Internet sites. This term
excludes direct Internet-mediated communications such as Skype or Face
Time, which merge video and voice media for direct communication. Such
platforms are not synonymous with the concept of "E-context" as the term
is used here because they are intended to imitate a real-time interpersonal
104. See United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 510 (4th Cir. 2012) ("Most other circuits also
continue to apply an objective test after Black, even though some courts focus on a 'reasonable
sender' of the communication or simply a 'reasonable person' familiar with all the circumstances.");
see also United States v. Stock, 728 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2013); United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d
944, 962-63 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing "contradictory case law" on the issue of intent).
105. United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2011).
106. See United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498 (4th Cir. 2012).
107. Hopkins, supra note 30, at 308-09; see also Sixth Circuit Holds that Subjective
Intent Is Not Required by the First Amendment When Prosecuting Criminal Threats, supra
note 72, at 1142.
108. See Elonis v. United States, 82 U.S.L.W. 3538 (June 16, 2014) (order granting certiorari).
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communicative experience between users and do not raise the same contextual
questions for courts as asynchronous and indirect communication platforms.
A. Examining E-Context Under the Objective Test: Variation in the
"Reasonable Person" Standard
1. Third Circuit Cases
In United States v. Elonis, defendant Anthony Elonis was prosecuted
under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) ("Section 875(c)")109 for posting threatening
messages on his Facebook page."0  These posts referred to Elonis's
estranged wife and an FBI agent who approached his home after
monitoring his violent Internet posts."' The threatening posts at issue
included references to rape, bestiality, guns, knives, high-caliber bullets,
school shootings, mortar attacks on his wife's home, and other illegal acts
and violent imagery, some of which were expressed as rap lyrics.112 At
trial, Elonis argued that Black and the First Amendment required a showing
of subjective intent to threaten.'13 Despite his First Amendment challenges,
a jury convicted Elonis under Section 875(c) for communicating threats
using an instrument of interstate commerce.114
Prior to reviewing Elonis, the Third Circuit had adopted an objective
test in United States v. Kosma."5  The Kosma court addressed two
questions: (1) whether the defendant possessed a general intent to make
the allegedly threatening communication; and (2) whether a "reasonable
speaker [in the defendant's position] would foresee the statement would be
interpreted as a threat" without considering whether the speaker actually
intended to threaten a target or actually believed that the statement would
likely be interpreted as a threat."16  On appeal, Elonis argued that the
court's standard violated the First Amendment since Black clearly requires
a finding of a subjective intent to threaten a specific target in order to
support a conviction under Section 875(c).117
109. United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 323 (3d Cir. 2013) cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W.
3538 (U.S. Feb. 14, 2014) (No. 13-983). Section 875(c) makes it a crime to "transmit in
interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat . . . to injure the
person of another." 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).
110. Elonis, 730 F.3d at 326-27.
111. Id. at326.
112. Id. at 325-36.
113. Id. at 327.
114. Id.
115. United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991).
116. Id.
117. Elonis, 730 F.3d at 327.
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The Third Circuit noted that Elonis had no prior history of listening to
or writing rap lyrics, indicating that the lack of history of communicating
through lyrics might be significant in the context of Internet posts.118
Nevertheless, the court decided the case without analyzing the contextual
implications of Elonis's choice of medium. The court instead analyzed the
temporal context of the Facebook posts only to determine whether the
conditional, vague, or reflective nature of some of Elonis's posts rendered
them toothless, protected abstractions of his desire that others experience
harm.'19 The Third Circuit thus failed to analyze the contextual importance
of Elonis's chosen medium except to say that Internet communications are
presumed to cover the full geographical reach of the Internet, thus
satisfying the statute's "interstate commerce" requirement.120 The court
then held that "a careful reading of the requirements of [Section] 875(c),
together with the definition from Black, does not, in [the Third Circuit's]
opinion, lead to the conclusion that Black introduced a specific-intent-to-
threaten requirement" under the First Amendment.12 1
The Third Circuit analyzed the contextual trappings of Internet threats
more thoroughly in United States v. Fullmer.12 2 The defendants in Fullmer
were convicted under the Animal Enterprise Protection Act ("AEPA")
and federal interstate anti-stalking statutes for posting protest messages to
their organizational and personal websites.12 3  They challenged the
convictions on First Amendment grounds, arguing that the AEPA
criminalized protected political coercion and that their actions did not
amount to unprotected true threats.12 4 The record contained hundreds of
screenshots from websites controlled by the extreme organization Stop
Huntingdon Animal Cruelty ("SHAC"), which was primarily concerned
with frustrating research company Huntingdon Life Sciences' animal
testing practices.12 5 The websites at issue involved speech that ranged from
abstract advocacy of violence to reports of SHAC's protests and resulting
harms delivered upon its targets as a result of the protests.12 6 Some of
118. Id. at 325.
119. Id. at 334. Specifically, the court found that, though Elonis did not specify a time and
place at which the threatened harm would occur, "taken as a whole, a jury could have found
[Elonis] was threatening to use explosives on officers who "[t]ry to enforce an Order" of
protection that was granted to his wife." Id.
120. Id. at 335.
121. Id. at 330.
122. See generally United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 2009).
123. See id. at 136.
124. Id. at 153.
125. Id. at 154.
126. Id. at 154-55.
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SHAC's radical followers perpetrated significant physical harms upon their
targets independently of any call to action by SHAC. 12 7
In upholding the conviction, the Third Circuit applied a "reasonable
speaker" standard to determine whether the website amounted to
unprotected true threats. The court found that the links between SHAC's
call for action and reports of successful attacks were linked directly to the
threatening nature of posting targets' personal information.12 8 The practice
created a context in which a target named on SHAC's website could
reasonably fear that the threats were real because of the pattern of
communication.129 The defendants in Fullmer created a record of past
successes, and maintained it permanently and publicly on the Internet to
instill fear into SHAC's future targets while exhibiting control over their
Internet and real-life audiences.130 These factors provided an ample basis
for liability under the Third Circuit's objective reasonable speaker standard
because the website was particularly robust and connected to the control of
real-life threatening actors.131
In United States v. Stock,132 decided approximately one month before
Elonis, the Third Circuit again declined to address the subjective intent
issue left in Black's wake. The court relied on an objective test for true
threats as viewed by a reasonable observer (not a reasonable speaker
standard, which the court applied in Elonis), and reiterated its adherence to
the decades-old Kosma decision.133 Though Stock was decided primarily as
a matter of statutory interpretation of Section 875(c) and specifically, the
word "threat," the court indicated that Internet communications should be
viewed in their "totality" to determine whether the message would be
perceived as a true threat.1 34 According to the court's reasonable-observer
test, contextual factors in the analysis broadly include temporal, linguistic,
and the totality of the surrounding factual circumstances related to the
defendant's message.13 5  The court, however, discussed at length the
defendant's subjective intent and actual state of mind. The court focused
on how the defendant's online posts, viewed in context, reinforced the
127. Id. at 153.
128. Fullmer, 584 F.3d at 164.
129. Id.
130. Id
131. Id. at 156.
132. United States v. Stock, 728 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2013).
133. Id. at 293 n.5 (quoting United States v. Zavrel, 384 F.3d 130, 136 (3d Cir. 2004))
(stating the that the correct standard for a true threat is whether a "reasonable person hearing or
reading the statement or receiving the communication would understand it as a serious expression
ofan intent to inflict injury").
134. Id. at 293 n.5.
135. Seeid at 299 n.12.
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perception that he maintained a specific intent to violently harm an
unnamed target despite the temporally uncertain nature of his posts, which
indicated past, present, and future intent to harm the target.136 The court
also relied substantially on linguistic evidence of the defendant's actual
intent to support an objective interpretation that his statements were true
threats despite the court's approach that requires merely that a reasonable
recipient of the communication would find that the statement amounted to a
true threat.137
The Third Circuit cases involving Internet threats illustrate
inconsistencies that arise from applying a strained objective standard to the
First Amendment true threats doctrine, which is meant to distinguish
protected expressive purposes from true threats. Although the Elonis court
did not discuss the inherent meaning of threats in an E-context, the Stock
court's discussion of the speaker's state of mind and Internet speech
patterns indicates that the Third Circuit considers the defendant's media
usage and actual state of mind in applying the objective test. This is a true
totality of the circumstances approach. The Third Circuit's purported
treatment of context and intent further complicates factual inquiries into the
defendant's intentions at the time when the defendant publishes the Internet
message. For example, instructing a jury to disregard the defendant's
specific intent to threaten, while simultaneously instructing the jury to
consider evidence related to the defendant's construction of a website and
his history of Internet or media use, complicates an already murky standard
since the very notion of personal media usage involves profoundly
subjective explanations for behaviors and intentions.
Though the Third Circuit's standard remains an iteration of objectivity,
the court's heavy reliance on the defendant's mindset and awareness
strongly indicates the application of a subjective-focused inquiry in its
constitutional true threats analysis. In these cases, the defendants' Internet
personas and Internet histories were highly relevant to whether or not a
speaker or observer could reasonably foresee that an Internet message or
136. Compare id. at 300 (emphasis added) ("We believe that a jury could reasonably find,
from his use of the present tense in the second sentence together with his description of his past
conduct in the first sentence, that Stock had not abandoned his prior intent, but that he still
harbored a present intent that he was unable to fulfill at that time.") with United States v.
Musgrove 845 F. Supp. 2d 932 (E.D. Wis. 2011). In Musgrove, the defendant's Craigslist post
referred to no person in particular but stated that a local mall would "make [da] news dis
weekend again" [sic] and implied that the defendant would bring a Glock handgun to the mall to
prove who "OWN[ed] dat mall" [sic]. Id. at 938. The court found that the defendant's statement
was sufficient for a reasonable juror to find that the defendant would do something violent with
the handgun at the mall the coming Saturday. Id at 945.
137. See Stock, 728 F.3d at 300 ("[A] jury could reasonably find... that Stock had not
abandoned his prior intent, but that he still harbored a present intent that he was unable to fulfill
at that time.").
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post would be considered a true threat. Nevertheless, in its most recent
discussion of the issue in Elonis, the Third Circuit maintained that no
language in Black affirmatively draws the defendant's state of mind into
the true threats analysis.'38
2. Tenth Circuit Cases
Two federal district courts, the District of Colorado and the Middle
District of Alabama, located within the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits,
respectively, seemingly have adopted an objective standard under the First
Amendment analysis for true threats cases since Black.139 These courts
focused on a purely hypothetical objective observer of the circumstances,
not on the mental state of a reasonable speaker or reasonable recipient of
the threat. In each case, though the courts adopted similar standards, they
analyzed the context with different concerns in mind and reached different
conclusions with respect to public Internet media.
In United States v. Wheeler, the defendant (located in Italy) published
on Facebook "instructions to kill law enforcement officers, politicians,
judges, district attorneys, public defenders and their children" in violation
of Section 875(c).14 0 The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the
statute under the First Amendment, arguing that the Facebook posts did not
amount to unprotected true threats.141 The district court distinguished the
factual record in Wheeler from the political hyperbole in Watts based on
the reactions of online message recipients and the Tenth Circuit's objective
standard.14 2  The Wheeler court then stated that two online observers'
reports to authorities "show[ed] that a reasonable person could perceive
Mr. Wheeler's posts as a true threat," regardless of whether other online
recipients found humor or political jest in the posts.14 3
The Wheeler court's reliance on essentially a two-member Internet
audience illustrates a limited view under an ostensibly objective
reasonableness analysis of E-context. Furthermore, the Wheeler court did
not make specific findings on the size of the Internet audience to
distinguish the facts from Watts. In Watts, the size of the audience at the
rally was known, rendering the immediate reach of the allegedly
138. United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted 82 U.S.L.W. 3538
(U.S. June 16, 2014) (No. 13-983). ("[W]e find that Black does not alter our precedent.").
139. See generally United States v. Wheeler, No. 12-cr-0138-WJM, 2013 WL 1942213
at *3-5 (D. Colo. May 10, 2013); United States v. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1280-90
(M.D. Ala. 2004).
140. Wheeler, 2013 WL 1942213 at *1.
141. Id. at *3.
142. Id at *5 (discussing the speech at issue in Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969)
(per curiam)).
143. Wheeler, 2013 WL 1942213 at *5.
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threatening communication both verifiable and finite.144 Given the socially
interconnected, and often public, nature of Facebook posts, their reach and
impact in Wheeler are unclear. The Wheeler case indicates one court's
willingness to use the reactions of a limited Internet audience as a proxy for
a larger community of hypothetical reasonable recipients. This approach is
not problematic in all cases, but presents serious challenges to Internet
speakers who transmit communications to a number of individuals who
may be familiar with the full context of the communication, the parties, or
the defendant's propensity to use the Internet for intimidating purposes.
The Wheeler court's consideration of speaker-focused contextual factors,
such as the actual intent, may have impacted this analysis, but it
nevertheless declined to discuss what effect, if any, the outcome of Black
had on the analysis.14 5
Wheeler also failed to square with two recent, seemingly inconsistent
Tenth Circuit cases. In United States v. Wolff the Tenth Circuit defined a
true threat as an objectively read "declaration of intention, purpose, design,
goal, or determination to inflict punishment,"l46 a standard that traces back
to the longstanding pre-Black decision, United States v. Viefhaus.147 But
VieJhaus did not necessarily solidify the intent standard in the Tenth
Circuit, leaving room for discord in the standard.148 In United States v.
Magleby, the court seemingly ignored VieJhaus and held that a true threat
must be made "with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm
or death." 49 This holding marks an important shift in language that clearly
evokes a specific intent requirement. The Wheeler court was aware of
Magleby, citing it to support the holding that reasonableness i  typically a
question of fact for the jury, but the court did not consider Magleby's
holding or its impact on the true threats doctrine in the Tenth Circuit.150
At a minimum, courts within the Tenth Circuit have seemingly refused to
read Magleby as an alteration of its intent standard prior to Black, even
though Magleby seemed to endorse the language of specific intent for true
threats.
144. See Watts, 394 U.S. at 706.
145. Wheeler, 2013 WL 1942213, at *4.
146. United States v. Wolff, 370 F. App'x 888 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Nielander v. Bd. of
Cnty. Comm'rs, 582 F.3d 1155, 1167 (10th Cir. 2009)) (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 892-93.
148. See id. at 892 ("It is the making of the threat and not the intention to carry out the threat
that violates the law. . . . The trier of fact, therefore, must decide whether a 'reasonable person
would find that a threat existed."').
149. United States v. Magleby, 420 F. 3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Virginia v.
Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003)) (emphasis added).
150. Wheeler, 2013 WL 1942213, at *4.
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Moreover, in United States v. Dillard, the District of Kansas (sitting in
the Tenth Circuit) held fast to VieJhaus, finding that "[w]hat is required is
simply the intentional sending of a communication, which the sender
knows a reasonable recipient will take as a serious expression of
violence."'5 1 Yet this "knowing" standard requires more than VieJhaus's
mere "objective declaration" standard. The "knowing" standard focuses on
the speaker's knowledge rather than merely the objectively threatening
reading of the communication.
The Tenth Circuit cases provide no clear explanation for why the
recognized Viejhaus "objective declaration" standard would even allow the
Magleby "made with intent" standard to encroach into the jurisprudence
without some important doctrinal shift. Specifically, the Wheeler decision
(applying an objective hypothetical reasonable person standard) and the
Dillard decision (seemingly adopting a standard for requiring knowledge
that the message is objectively threatening) portray confusion among courts
within the Tenth Circuit in interpreting its own precedent for intent.
As such, these cases help little to resolve the effect that Black had, if any,
on the true threats doctrine in this circuit.
3. Eleventh Circuit Cases
In United States v. Carmichael, the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama (sitting in the United States Eleventh Circuit)
also acknowledged post-Black that the Supreme Court had not settled on a
single test for true threats cases.152 The Eleventh Circuit has joined several
other circuits, however, in finding that Black did not import a subjective
intent requirement into the First Amendment true threats analysis.15 ' In
Carmichael, the defendant, who was charged with drug trafficking
offenses, posted the identities of several informants on a website he created
to gather information about the prosecution's case from the community.154
The prosecution moved for a protective order requiring the defendant to
shut down his website on the grounds that it constituted an unprotected true
threat and the defendant challenged the motion on First Amendment
grounds.155 One informant testified that she was so fearful for her life that
she left her home.156 Another informant testified that the website changed
his life and that he was scared to let his children outside.15 7
151. United States v. Dillard, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1178 (D. Kan. 2013).
152. United States v. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1280 (M.D. Ala. 2004).
153. See United States v. Martinez, 736 F.3d 981, 988 (11th Cir. 2013).
154. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 1281-82.
155. Id. at 1270.
156. Id. at 1289.
157. Id.
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The district court in Carmichael found that, despite commentators' and
courts' assertions to the contrary, the technological functions of the Internet
do not require Internet communications to take on greater or lesser
constitutional restriction than "more traditional media."58 Taking a more
liberal view of the Internet as a public forum, the court found that, in
general, "the case law is that speech that is broadcast to a broad audience is
less likely to be a 'true threat,' not more [likely to be a true threat]."l59
Moreover, the evidence of several particularly vulnerable informants, the
recollection of the history of harm directed toward informants in criminal
court cases, and witnesses' testimony related to their perceived meanings of
the Internet posts, did not support the objective finding of a true threat.160
The Carmichael court refused to accept the government's argument that the
website brought to mind past cases of harm to informants, and also refused
to look beyond the website itself and assess the defendant's use of the
Internet to build the contextual analysis.'6 1
Under the objective reasonable person standard articulated by the
federal district courts in Wheeler and Carmichael, neither of which was
appealed, the courts took sharply divergent views of the evidence regarding
an Internet threat's actual and objectively reasonable impact on the
audience as a matter of law. Fact-intensive and context-dependent rue
threats prosecutions are subject to radically different outcomes regarding
the question of the impact of the Internet. These cases demonstrate that
Internet threats cases have defied bright-line rules and led to the conclusion
that defendants who target a specific audience on the Internet by name and
personal information have enjoyed greater protection than defendants who
happen to frighten anonymous and untargeted readers of the defendants'
social media accounts.
Evidence related to an individual's particular purpose is relevant to
determining the reasonableness of the impact on intended and unintended
recipients of threats. For example, in New York ex rel Spitzer v. Cain, the
State Attorney General of New York brought a suit for injunctive relief
against defendants under the federal Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances
158. Id. (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997)).
159. Id at 1289 (quoting United States v. Bellrichard, 994 F.2d 1318, 1321 (8th Cir. 1993)).
160. Id.
161. See id. at 1285 (internal citation omitted) ("Nevertheless, it is important to recall that the
inquiry here is whether a reasonable person would view Carmichael's website as 'a serious
expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm,' not whether the site calls to mind other cases in
which harm has come to government informants, not whether it would be reasonable to think that
Carmichael would threaten an informant, and not whether Carmichael himself is somehow
threatening. Context can help explain the website's meaning, but it is the website that is the focus
of the court's inquiry. Although the broad social context makes the case closer, the background
facts described above are too general to make the Carmichael case site a 'true threat."').
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Act, and analogous New York laws that protect patients' access to abortion
clinics.162 The only Internet-related component of the case involved the
defendants recording the license plate numbers from targets' cars with the
supposed intent to post them or track clinic employees.163  Nevertheless,
the court indicated that a speaker's conduct itself could indicate a violent
purpose, and determinations of purpose were relevant to the objective
analysis for unprotected true threats under the First Amendment.' 6
B. The Reasonable Recipient Standard Iteration of the Objective Test
A number of federal circuits have adopted an objective standard that
tests whether a reasonable recipient of the communication would find that
the communication amounts to a true threat.165 Those courts tend to rely on
the landmark cross-burning case R.A. V v. St. Paul, in which the United
States Supreme Court proclaimed that the true threats doctrine is intended
to "protect individuals from the fear of violence" and "from the disruption
that fear engenders," in addition to protecting people "from the possibility
that the threatened violence will occur."l 66 R.A. V. lies outside the scope of
this article, but the federal circuits' articulation of the purpose of the true
threats doctrine is highly germane to the analysis of Internet threats. The
objective reasonable recipient standard directs ourts to the relationship
between the factual circumstances surrounding the threat, the defendant's
control over the means of carrying out the threat, and the recipient's
susceptibility to targeted harm.
1. Eighth Circuit Cases
United States v. Amaya,16 7 a recent decision of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Iowa (sitting in the Eighth
Circuit), illustrates the importance of the defendant's subjective intent
162. New York ex rel Spitzer v. Cain, 418 F. Supp. 2d 457, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
The defendants unsuccessfully challenged the application of the federal and state laws on a First
Amendment theory that their actions failed to qualify as unprotected true threats. See id. at 490
(stating that "nothing in this Order shall be construed to limit defendants and those acting in
concert with them from exercising their legitimate rights under the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution").
163. Id. at 477.
164. Id.; see also Brayshaw v. City of Tallahassee, 709 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1248 (N.D. Fla.
2010) (striking down a statute that outlawed posting personal information about a law
enforcement officer with the intent to intimidate the officer after a facial constitutional
challenge, because, absent some credible threatening context (either historical or current)
that communicates a violent meaning, the communication cannot qualify as a true threat).
165. See United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 329 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2013); see also United
States v. Jeffries 629 F.3d 473, 480-81 (6th Cir. 2013).
166. Elonis, 730 F.3d at 329 (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)).
167. United States v. Amaya, 949 F. Supp. 2d 895 (N.D. Iowa 2013).
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when analyzing the contextual totality of threatening communications. The
Eighth Circuit, both pre-Black and post-Black, has affirmed a reasonable
recipient iteration of the objective standard.168 The Amaya court found that
the defendant lacked the requisite intent to threaten under the First
Amendment to sustain an enhanced sentence for obstruction of justice in
the defendant's drug-related prosecution.'69  In Amaya, the defendant, an
alleged drug trafficker, posted the prosecution's witness list on Facebook as
a "snitch list," which carried a historically threatening connotation.o7 0
Nevertheless, the court found that the defendant "never intended" to
threaten any named witness on the list.' 7' The court emphasized that the
defendant never targeted his public Facebook post toward a person on the
list.17 2 This emphasis indicates the importance of an individual's approach
to an Internet audience, even in a jurisdiction that adopts an objective
standard for true threats.73 In light of the immense diversion in the intent
standard for true threats cases, Amaya is problematic. The Amaya court
recited a litany of facts related to the defendant's subjective intent, willful
conduct, and state of mind, even though the true threats jurisprudence in
the Eighth Circuit has expressly rejected the subjective intent requirement
both pre and post-Black. Such overlapping analyses fail to promote clarity
in either the First Amendment true threats doctrine or the appropriate
treatment of public Internet communications under an objective reasonable
person analysis.
2. Second Circuit Cases
Two other highly publicized federal circuit court cases illustrate the
importance of the defendant's control over notoriously violent or radical
groups and the context created by Internet communications that call for
members of such groups to harm others. For example, United States v.
Turner, a recent decision involving the conviction of shock radio show host
Harold "Hal" Turner under 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B), which makes it a
168. See United States v. Beale, 620 F.3d 856 (8th Cir. 2010). Beale involved direct e-mail
communications and thus did not fit the search parameters for this article. Nevertheless, both
Beale and Amaya rely on the pre-Black decision, Doe v. Pulaski County Special School District,
306 F. 3d 616 (8th Cir. 2002). Notably, the Amaya court's recitation of the facts revolve
primarily around the specific intent and conduct on behalf of the defendant. See generally United
States v. Amaya, 949 F. Supp. 2d 895, 908 (N.D. Iowa 2013).
169. Id. at 911-12.
170. Id. at 908.
171. Id at 911.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 910 (stating that the Eighth Circuit adopts an objective reasonable recipient
standard). For discussion of a similar standard adopted in other circuits, see infra Part IV.B.2-4.
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crime to threaten harm to a federal judge.174 Turner stated in his blog posts
that three Seventh Circuit judges deserved to be killed, and compared them
to United States District Court Judge Lefkow, whose husband and mother
were murdered following a highly publicized ruling against a World
Church of the Creator leader.175  Turner later published blog posts that
contained personal information about the judges.17 6  He also implied a
causal connection between the Lefkow murders, of which the Seventh
Circuit judges were personally aware,'7 7 and Turner's public calls for
retribution against Lefkow herself.178
The Second Circuit, under its objective test, held that a reasonable
recipient of Turner's communications could conclude that the messages
contained a true threat, particularly given that he "publicly implied a causal
connection between [his] call for judges' deaths and actual murders."7 9
While acknowledging that syntax and other contextual factors could
mitigate against a finding of an unprotected true threat, the court noted that
the speech at issue communicated a clear intent to interfere with the judges'
duties by evoking the recent murder of their colleague's family and by
publicly boasting that "public display of address information is 'an
effective way' to instill fear in the target."'80 The court mentioned in dicta
that Turner's statements qualified as unprotected true threats under both an
objective and subjective standards, though the First Amendment intent
issue was not reached because the defendant challenged his conviction
primarily on a First Amendment political speech distinction.18
The Second Circuit has yet to find an occasion to reexamine its
objective standard raised in Turner.'82 But the district court in New York ex
rel Spitzer v. Cain, sitting in the Second Circuit, indicated prior to Turner
that the defendant's particular, subjective purpose was relevant to
determining whether a reasonable person would consider conduct or
communications to be an unprotected true threat. Moreover, the Turner
court's emphasis on the defendant's specific intent supports the
174. United States v. Turner 720 F.3d 411, 413 (2d Cir. 2013).
175. Id. at 415.
176. Id. These posts included the judges' "photographs, work addresses, and room numbers
for each of the three judges, along with a map indicating the location of the courthouse in which
they worked, and a photograph of the building modified to point out 'Anti-truck bomb barriers."'
Id. at 414.
177. Id. at 416.
178. Id. at 422.
179. Turner, 720 F.3d at 422.
180. Id. at 423.
181. Id. at 420 n.4.
182. Id.
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consideration of the speaker's particular purpose even under an
objective analysis. .
3. Fourth Circuit Cases
In United States v. White,183 white supremacist leader William White
was convicted under Section 875(c) following a series of direct e-mail
communications with, and blog posts about, a Canadian civil rights
attorney Richard Warman; and for repeatedly calling and sending emails to
a Citibank employee Jennifer Petsche.184 White posted stories recounting a
neo-Nazi group's firebombing of a Canadian civil rights activist's home
followed by a call for others to "do it to Warman."'85 The Fourth Circuit
held that White's e-mail to Petsche amounted to an unprotected true threat
because of the implied causal connection with other heinous violent events
and White's apparent control over the means of consummating the threat.186
The court, however, held that the public calls for violence against Warman
amounted to protected political hyperbole because the prosecution could
not prove that White controlled dangerous members of the audience.187
The government argued that White's posts created a violent atmosphere,
and the district court acknowledged that the posts reached a substantial
number of like-minded white supremacists.'88  Nevertheless, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that White did not make the statements to a defined
group over which he exercised any meaningful control.189  The court
distinguished between "a serious desire that Warman be harmed by others
[and] a serious expression of intent to do harm from the perspective of a
reasonable recipient."'9 0
In a similar case involving a motion for sanctions against White, a
federal district court sitting in the Fourth Circuit held in 2013 that plaintiffs
in a Fair Housing Act suit could not impose sanctions against White based
on his hate-motivated public Internet posts.'91 The court reasoned that the
posts could not be meaningfully distinguished from those directed toward
the general public and were akin to abstract advocacy.192 Despite White's
183. United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 512 (4th Cir. 2012).
184. Id. at 501, 505-06.
185. Id. at 505.
186. Id at 512.
187. Id at 513.
188. United States v. White, No. 7:08-CR-00054, 2010 WL 438088 at *13 (W.D. Va. Feb. 4,
2010) (stating that White's postings more likely resembled crude methods of stating a political
statement similar to Watts rather than true threats).
189. White, 670 F.3d at 513.
190. Id. at 514 (emphasis in original).
191. In re White 2013, No. 2:07CV342, 2013 WL 5295652, at *59 (E.D. Va. Sept. 13, 2013).
192. Id.
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history of boasting about the impact his public speeches had on his
followers' violent acts against certain targets, and his direct communication
with the housing plaintiffs, the court held that his messages failed to
unequivocally communicate that his followers would carry out acts of
violence.19 3 The Fourth Circuit's holding in In re White thus suggests that
although a direct communication is not required to support a finding of a
true threat,194 an implied or actual causal connection communicated by the
speaker is likely to support such a finding.
Turner and White illustrate additional circuit splits on the appropriate
standard for intent in true threats cases. On similar facts related to publicly
available Internet posts, the White court in the Fourth Circuit found that
public statements linking past violent events to a current target did not
support a finding of a true threat.195 On the other hand, the Turner court in
the Second Circuit found that a similar politically charged wish for the
deaths of three judges could support a conviction based on a true threat
analysis.196  In both cases, the factual circumstances lacked a provable
causal connection between the speaker and the means of delivering
violence. Both cases, however, also fell against a backdrop of violent
political rhetoric and seemingly powerful, though pompous, extremist
speakers. The facts of these cases also indicated that the speakers sincerely
desired that he targets suffer serious bodily injury or death, and the targets
in both cases testified that they feared sincerely for their lives. The
divergence in analysis, however, turned on whether the speaker impliedly
or actually commanded the actions of other violent actors who would harm
the targets of the threatening messages. The Fourth Circuit in White
admitted that no evidence existed to determine whether the audience took
White's statements about his hopes for Warman's death for a joke, but
assumed that the group of like-minded individuals would understand
White's message as primarily political.197 White and Turner also featured
sharp dissents (discussed in Part IV.D. below) in which the dissenting
judges criticized the majority approach to analyzing the contextual
significance of the Internet as a public forum and the purpose of the
defendant in determining the gravity of threats in Internet spaces.198
193. Id.
194. White, 670 F.3d at 513.
195. Id.
196. United States v. Turner 720 F.3d 411, 422 (2d Cir. 2013).
197. White, 670 F.3d at 513.
198. See infra Part IV.D.
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4. Sixth Circuit Cases
In United States v. Jeffries, the Sixth Circuit considered the audience
and the reach of Internet communication in a true threats analysis.'99
There, the defendant was convicted under Section 875(c), for posting a
music video on YouTube in which the defendant himself sings an original
song with threatening language directed at the judge who presided over his
child custody matter.2 00 The YouTube video was not delivered to the judge
by the defendant, but by a third party.20' In denying the defendant's First
Amendment challenge, the Sixth Circuit held that Section 875(c) prohibits
any communication containing a true threat regardless of whether the
defendant subjectively intended to threaten the target or whether the
communication even reached the intended target, so long as a reasonable
observer would construe the communication to be a true threat.202
According to the Sixth Circuit, a relevant observer is any person to whom
the threatening communication is delivered once the communication is
uttered.203
The Sixth Circuit also addressed the contextual issues raised by the
defendant's history of online activity. Like the Fourth Circuit in White, the
Jeffries court found that the defendant's self-styled online persona was
temporally and contextually separate from the relevant context of the
allegedly threatening post.20 4  Moreover, the defendant's lone allegedly
threatening music video established enough context for the jury to
reasonably conclude that his speech amounted to an unprotected true
threat.205 Although the defendant purportedly expressed his humorous side
by posting hokey music videos to YouTube in the weeks leading up to his
allegedly threatening post, the Sixth Circuit ruled that this material may be
properly excluded from the contextual analysis.20 6 The Sixth Circuit
limited the scope of E-context to the communication itself and to other
Facebook communications that directly followed the video's distribution.20 7
A federal district court sitting in the District of Columbia Circuit has
recently adopted a similar approach, though the circuit has yet to squarely
199. United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied 82 U.S.L.W. 3178
(U.S. Oct. 7, 2013) (No. 12-1185).
200. Id. at 481.
201. Id at 477.
202. Id at 482.
203. Id. at 482-83.
204. Id. at 483.
205. Jefifries, 692 F.3d 483.
206. Id.
207. Id at 482.
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address the intent issue since Black.208 The contextual limits of a
defendant's Internet history and personality are thus unclear among the
circuits.
The Sixth Circuit, like other circuits that adopt an objective standard,
has relied on R.A. V. v. St. Paul,209 to support the constitutional premise that
true threats may be restricted consistent with the First Amendment to
protect recipients from the harms caused by their very utterance.2 10 This
synthesis of such constitutional bulwarks broadens the rationale underlying
the First Amendment true threats doctrine, and potentially does so
problematically. By equating recipients of threats with targets of threats
under the same objective standard in situations involving the open-access
Internet forums and social networks, the true threats doctrine becomes
unwieldy in expanding R.A. V. to protect potentially any Internet user.
While the recipient of a direct communication of a threat to harm another
may suffer some significant psychological or emotional harm, to presume
as a matter of law that a passive Facebook user or Internet forum
participant would suffer the same harm as an intended target is problematic
under the Sixth Circuit's definition of "recipient." In light of the blended
objective and subjective inquiries employed in some "objective standard"
circuits,211 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed a reading of
Black that requires subjective intent to be read into all statutes that
criminalize pure speech as true threats, in addition to any objective
requirements imposed by the statute.2 12
C. Examining E-Context Under the Subjective Test for True Threats
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, one of the
most influential federal circuit courts, has consistently rejected the purely
objective standard, finding that it is constitutionally insufficient under the
First Amendment to base a conviction solely on a jury determination of
whether a reasonable observer would perceive a communication as a true
208. In re Grand Jury Subpoena No. 11116275, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2012) (stating
that "while the statement appears within a larger group of preposterous tweets, this does not
automatically render the threat toothless," and separating the allegedly threatening Twitter post
that amounted to a "prima facie threat" from an array of related but distinct attempts at humor).
The court in In re Grand Jury Subpoena further questioned the constitutionality and usefulness of
the First Amendment objective intent standard employed by a majority of the circuits,
particularly in the context of anonymous Internet threats cases. Id. at 7.
209. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
210. United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 480 (6th Cir. 2013) cert. denied 82 U.S.L.W.
3178 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2013) (No. 12-1185) (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388. and Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)) (equating true threats with fighting words).
211. See supra Part II.A.
212. United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2011).
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threat.213 United States v. Bagdasarian is the Ninth Circuit's most recent
decision on the true threats doctrine, in which the court affirmed the use of
a subjective intent test under the First Amendment in addition to an
objective test.2 14
In Bagdasarian, the defendant was convicted in federal district court
under 18 U.S.C. § 879 ("Section 879",)215 for threatening to kill President
Barack Obama during his 2008 candidacy for President of the United
States, and appealed on the grounds that the evidence at trial was
insufficient to uphold his conviction.216 Under an online pseudonym,
Bagdasarian posted statements to the American International Group
Yahoo! Finance message board that included references to .50 caliber
ammunition and racism-laden wishes for someone to shoot President
217Obama. In overturning the conviction, Ninth Circuit strongly stated that
Black requires courts to analyze the subjective intent of the speaker in
prosecutions under all threats statutes.2 18 The court then determined that
the online posts failed to express a subjective intent to threaten President
Obama because they neither indicated that the defendant would
consummate the threat, nor did they suggest that the defendant controlled
any means of carrying out the threat, providing a layer of First Amendment
protection.2 19 The court also concluded under the objective elements of
Section 879 that the defendant's anonymity on the Yahoo! Finance
message board was any more or less likely to contribute to the objective
finding of an unprotected threat.2 20 The dissent, in accord with the District
of Columbia Circuit (which has yet to rule on whether the Black decision
requires both an objective and subjective test to true threats statutes),221
213. Id. at 1116.
214. Id. at 1117-18 (stating that a subjective analysis must accompany an objective analysis
even when the statute calls only for an objective determination of a true threat).
215. 18 U.S.C. § 879 (2000).
216. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1113-15.
217. Id. at 1115.
218. Id. at 1117.
219. Id. at 1122-23.
220. Id at 1120.
221. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena No. 11116275, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5-6 (D.D.C. 2012)
(citing Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1117). In In re Grand Jury Subpoena, the court discussed the
true threats doctrine in the context of a motion to quash a grand jury subpoena that sought to
compel Twitter to reveal the identity of the defendant. Id. at 2. The court stated that anonymity
on the Internet "introduces an element of ambiguity that renders an assessment of the threat's
legitimacy difficult." Id. at 6. Because this proceeding involved a motion to quash a subpoena
and not a motion to quash an indictment, the court did not rule on whether or not the Twitter posts
amounted to a true threat as a matter of law. See id
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found the issue of anonymity to be problematic to the objective contextual
analysis.2 22
Furthermore, the majority in Bagdasarian stated that the financial
character of the message board would be more likely "to blunt any
perception that statements made there were serious expressions of intended
violence."22 3 The court also reasoned that the fact that only one message
board user reported Bagdasarian weighed against finding that a
reasonable person would read the defendant's statements as a true threat.224
This rationale comports with the Middle District of Alabama in
Carmichael, and contrasts with the reasoning employed by the District
of Colorado in Wheeler.2 25
The Ninth Circuit also distinguished the facts of Bagdasarian from its
pre-Black decision in Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life
Activists on the grounds that Bagdasarian's posts revealed no connection,
either implicit or actual, to any pattern of behavior which typically could
lead to harm to named targets following Internet communications.2 26
Bagdasarian suggests that, absent directly threatening language or factual
context indicating that the defendant controls and plans to use certain
means to carry out a threat, the Ninth Circuit will likely hold true threats to
a strict subjective standard. In the court's view, applying a subjective
intent standard to true threats cases cures potential errors caused by
inadequate jury instructions or a statutory reading that clearly articulates
only an objective standard.227
Both the majority and the dissent in Bagdasarian acknowledged that
anonymous Internet threats might be more threatening in some
circumstances.22 8 But the dissent took a more protective position that
considered the "country's collective experience" around the time of the
defendant's communications and the memories of Internet threats that
presaged tragic events, such as mass shootings.229 The dissent argued that
the majority relied too heavily on the context of the forum, and failed to
222. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3dat 1i20-21.
223. Id. at 1121.
224. Id.
225. Compare id. with United States v. Wheeler, No. 12-cr-0138-WJM, 2013 WL 1942213,
at *4 (D. Colo. May 10, 2013) (finding that the impact on specific message recipients was highly
relevant to the objective reasonableness of the true threat interpretation), and United States v.
Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1280 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (finding that the impact on the targets
of the message, a DEA agent and several informants, did not necessarily support the finding of an
objectively construed true threat).
226. Bagdasarian,652F.3dat 1119 n.19.
227. See also United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 962 (9th Cir. 2007).
228. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d at 1120 n.20 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting in part).
229. Id. at 1126.
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properly consider the defendant's violent communications in a broader
factual context related to the use of the Internet to threaten impending
harms to others.2 30 The dissent emphasized that the defendant's statements
should be read separate and apart from the surrounding non-violent Internet
discussions on the forum. 23 1 Additionally, the defendant's specific use of
the Internet forum permitted him to "hide behind his [screen name's] cloak
of anonymity with the hope, one can infer, that he would not be found
out."232 According to the dissent, these facts supported a finding that
the defendant subjectively intended to threaten President Obama and
that a reasonable recipient could reach the conclusion that the
defendant's comments caused harm that fell outside the First
Amendment protection.2 33
D. The Dissenting Approaches and New Territory for Analysis of E-Context
The Ninth Circuit's response to Virginia v. Black drew the attention of
would-be dissenting judges in jurisdictions that apply purely objective tests
to the true threats doctrine even when the litigants did not request reversal
of precedent on the intent issue.234 For example, in United States v. Turner,
Second Circuit Judge Pooler dissented on the grounds that the defendant's
speech constituted protected violent advocacy rather than an unprotected
true threat.2 35 Although Judge Pooler took no position on whether Black
altered the Second Circuit's true threats analysis, she concluded that when
speech is ambiguous, the distinction between public and private discourse
becomes highly relevant to the impact of the threat.2 36 She also stated that
ample precedent from the Second Circuit and other circuits suggested that
courts should analyze threatening but ambiguous public speech as
incitement and not as a true threat.23 7 Judge Pooler's dissent suggests that
distinctions between Internet hreats and protected online advocacy "does
238not turn on the gravity of the speech" but on its form. Despite her
dissent and other circuit courts' post-Black adoption of the subjective
standard under the First Amendment, the Second Circuit was not prepared
to depart from its precedent.23 9
230. Id. at 1125-27.
231. Id. at 1128.
232. Id. at 1131.
233. Id.
234. United States v. Turner, 720 F.3d 411, 420 n.4 (2d Cir. 2013).
235. Id. at 429-30 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 432-33.
237. Id. at 433.
238. Id at 434.
239. Id
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Taking a firmer dissenting position in United States v. White, Fourth
Circuit Judge Floyd argued that Black effected a shift in the First
Amendment standard for determining intent in true threats cases, even if
Black's explicit language lacked a clear intent to abrogate the objective
intent (only) standard used by the majority of circuits.24 0 Taking the Ninth
Circuit's lead, and comporting his reasoning with established legal
scholarship on the true threats doctrine, Judge Floyd concluded that the
Court in Black adopted the ordinary meaning of the term "threaten" and
argued that intent to threaten is "[an absolutely necessary component] of a
constitutionally punishable threat" under the First Amendment2 4 1 that helps
courts to avoid stumbling into applying a constitutionally impermissible
negligence standard to criminal cases.242
Similarly, Sixth Circuit Judge Sutton, the author of the majority
opinion in Jeffries, wrote separately in a dubitante opinion24 3 to address his
foundational concerns surrounding the purely objective standard adopted
by the Sixth Circuit. Like Judge Floyd in his White dissent, Judge Sutton
argued that the ordinary dictionary definition of the word "threat," and
Congress's discussion of Section 875 in committee (both strangely absent
from other true threats decisions) compel a dual standard that analyzes both
the objectively reasonable impact and the subjectively intended purpose of
the allegedly threatening communication.2 44 Judge Floyd's and Judge Sutton's
dissenting and dubitante opinions, respectively, indicate a trend toward
broadening the contextual landscape of the true threats doctrine to build a
more speech-protective analysis for Internet speech. By operating upon the
premise that the government should avoid chilling core political speech,
courts may be poised to adopt a dual standard for true threats following Black.
V. Conclusion
The modern Internet environment is becoming increasingly public and
networked, and courts in the federal circuits appear to be taking notice.
Internet-mediated communications occupy substantial public space, and
240. United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 522 (4th Cir. 2013) (Floyd, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 523.
242. Id at 524 (citing Crane, supra note 63, at 1271-72).
243. A dubitante opinion expresses doubt regarding a legal premise or the particular
rationale of a decision without going so far as to declare the decision wrong. In Jeffries, Judge
Sutton wrote separately to question whether the Sixth Circuit had been interpreting Section 875
correctly from the outset, rather than to cast doubt on the court's interpretation of Sixth Circuit
precedent. See United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 485 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., dubitante),
cert. denied 82 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2013) (No. 12-1185).
244. Id
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Internet-mediated threats occupy the public consciousness.245 Thus far, the
Internet's particular technological qualities have not served as grounds
upon which to treat the Internet differently from other mass communication
or broadcast technologies.246 Nevertheless, some judges have embraced
relevant legal scholarship that supports distinctions for Internet speech
based on the medium's public, pervasive, and personal characteristics.24 7
Federal courts remain split on whether they should analyze the
contextual elements of threatening communications according to the
speaker's subjective communicative intent. The courts also exhibit a
significant lack of uniformity regarding the importance of whether an
allegedly threatening communication actually causes the target or some
recipient to experience fear that the individual will sustain bodily injury or
death. Some courts, including the Fourth Circuit in White, emphasize the
relationship between the speaker, the speaker's control over the audience,
and harm to the target under an objective standard. These courts view true
threats determinations as particularly problematic when the messages cause
psychological harm and are linked to the real world only by the speaker's
reference.2 48 The fragmented treatment of the intent standards leaves open
divergent, but constitutionally permissible, applications of the true threats
doctrine to the Internet's peculiar qualities in cases of Internet threats. A
purely objective analysis under the true threats doctrine enables courts to
come to drastically different conclusions regarding the effect that an
allegedly threatening message actually has on the audience.2 49
Research grounded in social semiotics as applied to modes of
communication frequently used for threatening speech supports the
conclusion that the Supreme Court's forthcoming reexamination of the
First Amendment true threats doctrine in Elonis v. United States may
soundly account for the particular social impacts of speech in permanent
and freely accessible Internet spaces.250  An inquiry that blends the
subjective and objective analyses for the purposes of determining a true
threat will allow lower courts to develop further inquiry into the purpose
245. United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1126 (9th Cir. 2011) (Wardlaw, J.,
dissenting in part).
246. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 863 (1997).
247. See White, 670 F.3d at 524-25 (Floyd, J., dissenting in part); see also Bagdasarian,
652 F.3d 1125-29 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting in part).
248. See, e.g., White, 670 F.3d at 513.
249. Compare United States v. Wheeler, No. 12-cr-0138-WJM, 2013 WL 1942213 at *7 (D.
Colo. May 10, 2013) (finding that two complaints to law enforcement indicated that an objective
reasonable person would consider the communication to be a true threat), with Bagdasarian, 652
F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that a single complaint to law enforcement did not indicate
that the defendant's language met the objective test for a true threat).
250. See Strauss, supra note 80, at 256.
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underlying the defendant's communication. Nevertheless, no fewer than
three federal courts have concluded that this hybrid analysis qualifies as a
relevant inquiry for determining whether a threat truly communicates the
sort of harm against which the true threats doctrine is designed to protect.2 51
A subjective intent standard, coupled with existing constitutional and
statutorily defined objective standards, promotes a prosecutorial framework
that will explore the meaningful aspects of a defendant's online persona
and behaviors.252 Such aspects include the defendant's past history of
consummated criminal acts arising out of prior threats by himself or
others,253 or the breadth of his online audience of followers,2 54 all of which
tend to add meaningful context to otherwise context-free communications
posted on the Internet.
Moreover, a constitutional test for determining true threats hould
allow room for all relevant "contextual factors necessary to decide whether
a particular [act] is intended to intimidate,"255 including a defendant's
particular usage of technology for an expressive purpose. Such a totality of
the circumstances inquiry promotes complete factual analysis of the entire
ecosystem of communication (i.e., speaker, medium, content, social
context, target, and other recipients). It also comports with the Supreme
Court's goal in Black-to ferret out proscribable intimidation and separate
it from protected violent rhetoric. This approach also maintains the speech-
protective, First Amendment spirit of Watts, which is grounded in viewing
all speech in its full physical, social, political, and communicative context
in order to determine the level of constitutional protection.2 5 6
The Supreme Court now stands on the cusp of deciding Elonis, which
heavily implicates the First Amendment concerns with the defendant's
subjective state of mind and the cultural context surrounding potentially
threatening messages.257 The Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection
of Free Expression, the Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project, and
251. See, e.g., New York ex rel Spitzer v. Cain, 418 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); United
States v. Turner, 720 F. 3d 411 (2d Cir. 2013); see also supra Part V.A.3.
252. See United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 482-83 (6th Cir. 2013) (discussing the
defendant's online presence, including his Facebook posts, and his use of YouTube to post
humorous videos).
253. Compare Turner, 720 F.3d at 428 (construing as a true threat the defendant's references
to prior acts of violence following his call for retribution against a federal judge), with White, 670
F.3d at 513 (construing as protect abstract advocacy the defendant's call for a firebombing of a
civil rights lawyer's home by fellow white supremacists).
254. See White, 670 F.3d at 513.
255. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 367 (2003).
256. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (emphasizing the full context of
the communication, including the reaction of listeners).
257. United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2013) cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3538
(U.S. June 16, 2014) (No. 13-983).
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the Pennsylvania Center for the First Amendment jointly filed a brief in
support of Elonis's petition for certiorari as amici curiae. 258 They argued
that the Elonis presented an "ideal opportunity for the [Court] to determine
whether its current true threats doctrine is compatible with contemporary
modes of communication." The brief emphasizes that social networks and
Internet forums invite increasingly problematic applications of the true
threats doctrine established in Watts. Allegedly threatening
communications through social media are able to reach unintended and
innumerable recipients at the "blink of an eye" even when the original
speaker never intends that certain recipients receive the communications.25 9
Because some speakers cannot control the distribution of such messages,
violent speech can reach notoriously dangerous like-minded groups, as well
as the Internet version of passersby who, without the benefit of context,
may legitimately fear that a dangerous true threat has been communicated.
In this respect, the speaker's state of mind is highly relevant to determining
whether a proscribable harmful act has occurred. Rather than relying on a
purely objective reading of a potentially decontextualized Internet message,
courts should adopt a First Amendment test that focuses on identifying the
harmful intent in the speaker's expression or the knowledge of a harmful
impact on the likely recipient. Such a test would more appropriately
protect cathartic and self-centered expressions that happen to include
violent imagery that holds significance to the speaker's expressive
purposes. Neither Watts nor Black yielded a consistent approach to the
intent standard or the treatment of the communication's full context. As
such, the Supreme Court's forthcoming review of Elonis should clarify
Black and set a pivot point for the future of violent, yet cathartic, speech on
the Internet.
In clarifying Justice O'Connor's "means to communicate" language in
Black, the Court in Elonis may raise profound ancillary questions about
how Facebook and other social media either facilitate or cloud the non-
threatening meanings intended by certain speakers who use social media
platforms for catharsis. The Court may also explain the standard required
under Watts and Black in making a constitutional inquiry into all of the
"relevant contextual factors" in a true threats case. If the Court adopts a
subjective intent standard to all true threats statutes, then a defendant's
fondness for another rapper's controversial lyricS260 or his interest in
258. Brief for Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner Elonis, United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 2014 WL 4298029 (No. 13-983).
259. Id. at *5.
265. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *5, Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 2014 WL 645438 (No. 13-983)
(describing Elonis's testimony that his rap lyrics were heavily influenced by the work of rapper
Eminem).
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quoting antiestablishment comedy sketches will become highly relevant to
the jury's assessment of guilt. Moreover, juries would be required to at
least consider admissible evidence related to the defendant's specific
references to cultural tropes, such as gangster rap that frequently evoke
violent imagery for expressive, artistic purposes. If the Court follows the
majority of the federal circuits and upholds the objective reasonable person
standard as the only requirement under Black, then it would signal to
speakers that, in open Internet forums, such Facebook, the speaker bears
the responsibility for all reasonable interpretations of their incendiary posts,
regardless of whether the speaker actually intended to threaten. In this
respect, the Court's decision in Elonis will either allocate additional social
responsibility or provide additional communicative freedom to online
speakers.
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